Since early 2000, Tehran has had access to “secret United Nations atomic agency reports,” according to a new Wall Street Journal report. They cite Middle East intelligence officials as saying that “Iranian records were circulated among senior Iranian military, government, and nuclear-program officials between 2004 and 2006” and that “Iran could design answers that admit to what the International atomic energy agency (IAEA) already knows, give away information that it will likely discover on its own, and better hide what the IAEA does not yet know that Iran wants to keep hidden.”
The National Council of Resistance of Iran’s (NCRI) history of nuclear revelations, particularly during and after the August 2002 press conference in Washington, DC, revealing the sites in Natanz and Arak, demonstrates how hard we have tried to warn the world that “the Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) have entered the regime’s nuclear weapons program” to speed up development, increase concealment, and mislead IAEA experts on tours of its nuclear sites.
The regime razed the Lavizan-Shian Technological Research Center after revealing it on May 15, 2003, and unearthed all evidence before the nuclear watchdog could visit it. Other sites, such as Parchin, Lavizan II, Lashkar Abad, and Malek Ashtar University in Tehran, have never been properly inspected, and most of the regime’s sites have been closed off to the public under the guise of being a military zone. Several sites on the agency’s list still have nuclear traces that are unknown and unanswered.
In addition to Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who oversaw the bomb-making program, the NCRI exposed dozens of other nuclear scientists and officials, including Brigadier General Seyed Ali Hosseini Tash, Mohamad Amin Bassam, and Fereydoon Abbasi, to name a few. Tehran managed to keep almost all of its people involved in nuclear weapons development from being questioned by the IAEA.
Despite widespread belief in the US intelligence community that Tehran had halted activities related to its nuclear weapons program after 2003, the Iranian Resistance continued to expose nuclear explosive tests and laser enrichment at the Parchin site, the Iranian regime’s secret project to produce Plutonium 210 and Beryllium for use in atomic bomb detonators, the Ceramic Matrix Composite project, the Maraging steel project, and the obtain tritium project, among other things.
Nonetheless, certain governments and many major publications chose to dismiss these revelations as untrustworthy, instead of relying on official Tehran rhetoric or intermediaries with ties to the regime. Because the NCRI has never crossed that line, it is immune to the regime’s spoon-feeding and double-rhetoric.
The NCRI data, as well as the Iranian regime’s outspoken behavior, clearly demonstrate that Tehran never gave up its nuclear weapons program. Instead, it has taken full advantage of Europe’s and America’s appeasement policies to advance the program while the rest of the world watches.
The WSJ report rightly speaks of “a serious breach of IAEA internal security.” However, Congress should play its role in getting to the bottom of this very serious issue. In a recent congressional hearing on the JCPOA negotiations, Senate Foreign Relations Chairman, Bob Menendez said, “If Iran begins to enrich uranium to 90 percent, what is the U.S. prepared to do? Using every bit of leverage and deterrence, how do we stop Iran from mastering the weaponization of a nuclear device?”
If world leaders discussing the nuclear dossier with the Iranian regime are serious about never allowing Tehran to acquire nuclear weapons, they should not look for answers on the other side of the negotiating table, but rather examine their own source of knowledge before making decisions.